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Law as Interpretation? 
 
Ronald Dworkin* 
 
In this essay I shall argue that legal practice is an exercise in inter-
pretation not only when lawyers interpret particular documents or stat-
utes, but generally. Law so conceived is deeply and thoroughly political. 
Lawyers and judges cannot avoid politics in the broad sense of political 
theory. But law is not a matter of personal or partisan politics, and a 
critique of law that does not understood this difference will provide 
poor understanding and even poorer guidance. I propose that we can 
improve our understanding of law by comparing legal interpretation 
with interpretation in other fields of knowledge, particularly literature. I 
also expect that law, when better understood, will provide a better grasp 
of what interpretation is in general. 
 
I.   Law 
 
The Central problem of analytical jurisprudence is this: What sense 
should be given to propositions of law? By propositions I mean the 
various statements lawyers make reporting what the law is on some 
question or other. Propositions of law can be very abstract and general, 
like the proposition that states of the United States may not discriminate 
on racial grounds in supplying basic services to citizens, or they can be 
relatively concrete, like the proposition that someone who accepts a 
check in the normal course of business without notice of any infirmities 
in its title is entitled to collect against the maker, or very concrete, like 
the proposition that Mrs. X is liable in damages to Mr. Y in the amount 
of $1150 because he slipped on her icy sidewalk and broke his hip. In 
each case a puzzle arises. What are propositions of law really about? 
What in the world could make them true or false? 
The puzzle arises because propositions of law seem to be descrip-
tive- they are about how things are in the law, not about how they 
should be- and yet it has proved extremely difficult to say exactly what 
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it is that they describe. Legal positivists believe that propositions of law 
are indeed wholly descriptive: they are in fact pieces of history. A 
proposition of law, in their view, is true if some event of a designated 
law-making kind has taken place, and otherwise not. This seems to work 
reasonably well in very simple cases. If the Illinois Legislature enacts the 
words, "No will shall be valid without three witnesses," then the 
proposition of law, that an Illinois will needs three witnesses, seems to 
be true only in virtue of that historical event. 
But in more difficult cases the analysis fails. Consider the prop-
osition that a particular affirmative action scheme (not yet tested in the 
courts) is constitutionally valid. If that is true, it cannot be so just in 
virtue of the text of the Constitution and the fact of prior court decisions, 
because reasonable lawyers who know exactly what the Constitution 
says and what the courts have done may yet disagree whether it is true. 
(I am doubtful that the positivists' analysis holds even in the simple case 
of the will; but that is a different matter I shall not argue here.) 
What are the other possibilities? One is to suppose that controver-
sial propositions of law, like the affirmative action statement, are not 
descriptive at all, but are rather expressions of what the speaker wants 
the law to be. Another is more ambitious: controversial statements are 
attempts to describe some pure objective or natural law, which exists in 
virtue of objective moral truth rather than historical decision. Both these 
projects take some legal statements, at least, to be purely evaluative as 
distinct from descriptive: they express either what the speaker prefers -
his personal politics- or what he believes is objectively required by the 
principles of an ideal political morality. Neither of these projects is 
plausible, because someone who says that a particular untested 
affirmative action plan is constitutional does mean to describe the law as 
it is rather than as he wants it to be or thinks that, by the best moral 
theory, it should be. He might, indeed, say that he regrets that the plan is 
constitutional and thinks that according to the best moral theory, it 
ought not to be. 
There is a better alternative: propositions of law are not simply 
descriptive of legal history in a straightforward way, nor are they simply 
evaluative in some way divorced from legal history. They are inter-
pretive of legal history, which combines elements of both description 
and evaluation but is different from both. This suggestion will be con-
genial, at least at first blush, to many lawyers and legal philosophers. 
They are used to saying that law is a matter of interpretation; but only, 
perhaps, because they understand interpretation in a certain way. When 
a statute (or the Constitution) is unclear on some point, because 
 
some crucial term is vague or because a sentence is ambiguous, lawyers 
say that the statute must be interpreted, and they apply what they call 
"techniques of statutory construction." Most of  the literature assumes 
that interpretation of a particular document is a matter of discovering 
what its authors (the legislators, or the delegates to the Constitutional 
Convention) meant to say in using the words they did. But lawyers 
recognize that on many issues the author had no intention either way 
and that on others his intention cannot be discovered. Some lawyers take 
a more skeptical position. They say that whenever judges pretend they 
are discovering the intention behind some piece of legislation, this is 
simply a smoke screen behind which the judge impose their own view of 
what the statute should have been. 
Interpretation as a technique of legal analysis is less familiar in the 
case of the common law, but not unfamiliar. Suppose the Supreme Court 
of Illinois decided, several years ago, that a negligent driver who ran 
down a child was liable for the emotional damage suffered by the child's 
mother, who was standing next to the child on the road. Now an aunt 
sues another careless driver for emotion when she heard, on the 
telephone many miles from the accident, that her niece had been hit. 
Does the aunt have a right to recover for damage? Lawyers often say 
that this is a matter of interpreting the earlier decision correctly. Does 
the legal theory on which the earlier judge actually relied, in making his 
decision about the mother on the road, cover the aunt on the telephone? 
Once again skeptics point out that it is unlikely that the earlier judge had 
in mind any theory sufficiently developed so as to decide the aunt's case 
either way, so that a judge "interpreting" the earlier decision is actually 
making new law the way he or she thinks best. 
The idea of interpretation cannot serve as a general account of the 
nature or truth of propositions of law, however, unless it is cut loose 
from these associations with the speaker's meaning or intention. 
Otherwise it becomes simply one version of the positivists thesis that 
propositions of law describe decisions made by people or institutions in 
the past. If interpretation is to form the basis of a different and more 
plausible theory about propositions of law, then we must develop a 
more inclusive account of what interpretation is. But that means that 
lawyers must not treat legal interpretation as an activity sui generis. We 
must study interpretation as a general activity, as a mode of knowledge, 
by attending to other contexts of that activity. 
Lawyers would do well to study literary and othe forms of artistic 
interpretation. That might seem bad advice (choosing the fie over the 
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frying pan) because critics themselves are thoroughly divided about 
what literary interpretation is, and the situation is hardly better in the 
other arts. But that is exactly why lawyers should study these debates. 
Not all of the battles within literary criticism are edifying or even com-
prehensible, but many more theories of interpretation have been de-
fended in literature than in law, and these include theories that 
challenge the flat distinction between description and evaluation that 
has enfeebled legal theory. 
 
II. Literature 
 
A.   The Aesthetic Hypothesis 
 
If lawyers are to benefit from a comparison between legal and literary 
interpretation, however, they must see the latter in a certain light, and in 
this section I shall try to say what that is. (I would prefer the following 
remarks about literature to be uncontroversial among literary scholars, of 
course, but I am afraid they will not be.) Students of literature do many 
things under the titles of "interpretation" and "hermeneutics," and most of 
them are also called "discovering the meaning of a text." I shall not be 
interested, except incidentally, in one thing these students do, which is 
trying to discover the sense in which some author used a particular word or 
phrase. I am interested instead in arguments that offer some sort of 
interpretation of the meaning of a work as a whole. These sometimes take 
the form of assertions about characters: that Hamlet really loved his mother, 
for example, or that he really hated her, or that there really was no ghost but 
only Hamlet himself in a schizophrenic manifestation. Or about events in 
the story behind the story: that Hamlet and Ophelia were lovers before the 
play begins (or were not). More usually they offer hypotheses directly about 
the "point" or "theme" or "meaning" or "sense" or "tone" of the play as a 
whole: that Hamlet is a play about death, for example, or about generations, 
or about politics. These interpretive claims may have a practical point. They 
may, for example, guide a director staging a new performance of the play. 
But they may also be of more general importance, helping us to an 
improved understanding of important parts of our cultural environment. Of 
course, difficulties about the speaker's meaning of a particular word in the 
text (a "crux" of interpretation) may bear upon these larger matters. But the 
latter are about the point or meaning of the work as a whole, rather than the 
sense of a particular phrase. 
Critics much disagree about how to answer such questions. I want, so 
far as is possible, not to take sides but to try to capture the disagreements in 
some sufficiently general description of what they are  
 
disagreeing about. My apparently banal suggestion (which I shall call 
the "aesthetic hypothesis") is this: an interpretation of a piece of litera-
ture attempts to show which way of reading (or speaking or directing or 
acting) the text reveals it as the best work of art. Different theories or 
schools or traditions of interpretation disagree on this hypothesis, be-
cause they assume significantly different normative theories about what 
literature is and what it is for and about what makes one work of 
literature better than another. 
I expect that this suggestion, in spite of its apparent weakness, will 
be rejected by many scholars as confusing interpretation with criticism 
or, in any case, as hopelessly relativistic, and therefore as a piece of 
skepticism that really denies the possibility of interpretation altogether. 
Indeed the aesthetic hypothesis might seem simply another formulation 
of a theory now popular, which is that since interpretation creates a 
work of art, and represents only the fiat of a particular critical commu-
nity, there are only interpretations and no best interpretation of any 
particular poem or novel or play. But the aesthetic hypothesis is neither 
so wild nor so weak nor so inevitably relativistic as might first appear. 
Interpretation of a text attempts to show it as the best work of art it 
can be, and the pronoun insists on the difference between explaining a 
work of art and changing it into a different one. Perhaps Shakespeare 
could have written a better play based on the sources he used for Hamlet 
than he did, and in that better play the hero would have beer more 
forceful man of action. It does not follow that Hamlet, the play he wrote, 
really is like that after all. Of course, a theory of interpretation must 
contain a subtheory about identity of a work of art in order to be able to 
tell the difference between interpreting and changing a work. (Any 
useful theory of identity will be controversial, so this is one obvious way 
in which disagreements in interpretation will depend more general 
disagreements in aesthetic theory.) 
Contemporary theories of interpretation all seem to use, as part of 
their response to that requirement, the idea of a canonical text (or score, 
in the case of music, or unique physical object in the case of most art). 
The text provides one severe constraint in the name of identity: all the 
words must be taken account of and none may be changed to make "it" a 
putatively better work of art. (This constraint, however familiar, is not 
inevitable. A joke, for example, may be the same joke though told in a 
variety of forms, none of them canonical; an interpretation of a joke will 
choose a particular way in which to put it, and this may be wholly 
original, in order to bring out its "real" point or why it 
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is "really" funny.) So any literary critic's style of interpretation will be 
sensitive to his theoretical beliefs about the nature of and evidence for a 
canonical text. 
An interpretive style will also be sensitive to the interpreter's opin-
ions about coherence or integrity in art. An interpretation cannot make a 
work of art more distinguished if it makes a large part of the text 
irrelevant, or much of the incident accidental, or a great part of the trope 
or style unintegrated and answering only to independent standards of 
fine writing. So it does not follow, from the aesthetic hypothesis, that 
because a philosophical novel is aesthetically more valuable than a 
mystery story, an Agatha Christie novel is really a treatise on the 
meaning of death. This interpretation fails, not only because an Agatha 
Christie novel, taken to be a treatise on death, is a poor treatise less 
valuable than a good mystery, but because the interpretation makes the 
novel a shambles. All but one or two sentences would be irrelevant to 
the supposed theme; and the organization, style, and figures would be 
appropriate not to a philosophical novel but to an entirely different 
genre. Of course some books originally offered to the public as mysteries 
or thrillers (and perhaps thought of by their authors that way) have 
indeed been "reinterpreted" as something more ambitious. The present 
critical interest in Raymond Chandler is an example. But the fact that 
this reinterpretation can be successful in the case of Chandler, but not 
Christie, illustrates the constraint of integrity. 
There is nevertheless room for much disagreement among critics 
about what counts as integration, about which sort of unity is desirable 
and which irrelevant or undesirable. Is it really an advantage that the 
tongue of the reader, in reading a poem aloud, must "mime" motions or 
directions that figure in the tropes or narrative of the poem? Does this 
improve integrity by adding yet another dimension of coordination? Is it 
an advantage when conjunctions and line endings are arranged so that 
the reader "negotiating" a poem develops contradictory assumptions 
and readings as he goes on, so that his understanding at the end is very 
different from what it was at discrete points along the way? Does this 
add another dimension of complexity to unity, or does it rather 
compromise unity because a work of literature should be capable of 
having the same meaning or import when read a second time? Schools 
of interpretation will rise or fall in response to these questions of 
aesthetic theory, which is what the aesthetic hypothesis suggests. 
The major differences among schools of interpretation are less 
subtle, however, because they touch not there quasi-formal aspects of art 
but the function or point of art more broadly conceived. Does liter- 
 
ature have (primarily or substantially) a cognitive point? Is art better 
when it is in some way instructive, when we learn something from it 
about how people are or what the world is like? If so, and if 
psychoanalysis is true (please forgive that crude way of putting it), then a 
psychoanalytic interpretation of a piece of literature will show why it is 
successful art. Is art good insofar as it is successful communication in the 
ordinary sense? If so, then a good interpretation will focus on the author 
intended, because communication is not successful unless it expresses 
what a speaker wants it to express. Or is art good when expressive in a 
different sense, insofar as it has the capacity to stimulate or inform the 
lives of those who experience it? If so, then interpretation will place the 
reader (or listener or viewer) in the foreground. It will point out the 
reading of the work that makes it most valuable- best as a work of art- in 
that way. 
Of course theories of art do not exist in isolation from philosophy, 
psychology, sociology, and cosmology. Someone who accepts a religious 
point of view will probably have a different theory of art from someone 
who does not, and recent critical theories have made us see how far 
interpretive style is sensitive to beliefs about meaning, reference, and 
other technical issues in the philosophy of language. But the aesthetic 
hypothesis does not assume that anyone who interprets literature will 
have a fully developed and self-conscious aesthetic theory. Nor that 
everyone who interprets must subscribe entirely to one or another of the 
schools I crudely described. The best critics, I think, deny that there is one 
unique function or point of literature. A novel or a play may be valuable 
in many number of ways, some of which we learn by reading or looking 
or listening, rather than by abstract reflection about what good art must be 
like or for. 
Nevertheless anyone who interprets a work of art relies on beliefs of 
a theoretical character about identity and other formal propertiesof art, 
as well as more explicitly normative beliefs about what is good in art. 
Both sorts of beliefs figure in the judgment that one way of reading a 
text makes it a better text than another way. These beliefs may 
inarticulate (or "tacit"). They are still genuine beliefs (and not merely 
"reactions") because their force for any critic or reader can be seen at 
work not just on one isolated occasion of interpretation, but in any 
number of other occasions, and because they figure in and are amenable 
to argument.1  (These weak claims do not, of course, take sides in the 
running debate on whether there are any necessary or sufficient 
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"principles of value" in art, or whether a theory of art could ever justify 
an interpretation in the absence of direct experience of the work being 
interpreted.)2 
None of this touches the major complaint I anticipated against the 
aesthetic hypothesis: that it is trivial. Obviously (you might say) differ-
ent interpretive styles are grounded in different theories of what art is 
and what it is for and what makes art good art. The point is so banal that 
it might as well be put the other way around: different theories of art are 
generated by different theories of interpretation. If someone thinks 
stylistics are important to interpretation, he will think a work of art 
better because it integrates pronunciation and trope; if someone is 
attracted by deconstruction, he will dismiss reference in its familiar 
sense from any prominent place in an account of language. Nor does my 
elaboration of the hypothesis in any way help to adjudicate amongst 
theories of interpretation or to rebut the charge of nihilism or relativism. 
On the contrary, since people's views about what makes art good art are 
inherently subjective, the aesthetic hypothesis abandons hope of 
rescuing objectivity in interpretation except, perhaps, among those who 
hold very much the same theory of art, which is hardly very helpful. 
No doubt the aesthetic hypothesis is in important ways banal- it 
must be abstract if it is to provide an account of what a wide variety of 
theories disagree about- but it is perhaps not so weak as all that. The 
hypothesis has the consequence that academic theories of interpretation 
are no longer seen as what they often claim to be- analyses of the very 
idea of interpretation- but rather as candidates for the best answer to the 
substantive question posed by interpretation. Interpretation becomes a 
concept of which different theories are competing conceptions. (It 
follows that there is no radical difference but only a difference in the 
level of abstraction between offering a theory of interpretation and of-
fering an interpretation of a particular work of art.) The hypothesis 
denies, moreover, the sharp distinctions some scholars have cultivated. 
There is no longer a flat distinction between interpretation, conceived as 
discovering the real meaning of a work of art, and criticism, conceived 
as evaluating its success or importance. Of course some distinction 
remains because there is always a difference between saying how 
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good a particular work can be made to be and saying how good that is. 
But evaluative beliefs about art figure in both these judgments.  
Objectivity is another matter. It is an open question, I think, whether 
the main judgments we make about art can properly be  true or false, 
valid or invalid. This question is part of the more general philosophical 
issue of objectivity, presently much discussed in both ethics and the 
philosophy of language, and no one is entitled to a position who studies 
the case of aesthetic judgment alone. Of course no important aesthetic 
claim can be "demonstrated" to be true or false; no argument can be 
produced for any interpretation that we can be sure will commend itself 
to everyone, or even everyone with experience and training in the 
appropriate form of art. If this is what it means to say that aesthetic 
judgments are subjective- that they are not demonstrable- then of course 
they are subjective. But it does not follow that no normative theory 
about art is better than any other, nor that one theory cannot be the best 
that has so far been produced. 
The aesthetic hypothesis reverses (I think to its credit) a familiar 
strategy. E.D. Hirsch, for example, argues that only a theory like his can 
make interpretation objective and particular interpretations valid.3 This 
seems to me a mistake on two connected grounds. Interpretation is an 
enterprise, a public institution, and it is wrong to assume, a priori, that 
the propositions central to any public enterprise must be capable of 
validity. It is also wrong to assume much about what validity in such 
enterprises must be like- whether validity requires the possibility of 
demonstrability, for example. It seems better to proceed more 
empirically here. We should first study a variety of activities in which 
people assume that they have good reasons for what they say, which 
they assume hold generally and not just from one or another individual 
point of view. We can then judge what standards people accept in 
practice for thinking that they have reasons of that kind. 
Nor is the point about reversibility- that a theory of art may depend 
upon a theory of interpretation as much as vice versa -an argument 
against the aesthetic hypothesis. I am not defending any particular 
explanation of how people come to have either theories of interpretation 
or theories of art, but only a claim about the argumentative connections 
that hold between these theories however come by. Of course, even at 
the level of argument, these two kinds of theories are mutually 
reinforcing. It is plainly a reason for doubting any theory of what an 
object of art is, for example, that the theory generates an obvi- 
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ously silly theory of interpretation. My point is exactly that the connection 
is reciprocal, so that anyone called upon to defend a particular approach 
to interpretation would be forced to rely on more general aspects of a 
theory of art, whether he realizes it or not. And this may be true even 
though the opposite is, to some extent, true as well. It would be a mistake, 
I should add, to count this fact of mutual dependence as offering, in itself, 
any reason for skepticism or relativism about interpretation. This seems to 
be the burden of slogans like "interpretation creates the text," but there is 
no more immediate skeptical idea that what we take to be a work of art 
must comport with what we take interpreting a work of art to be than in 
the analogous idea that what we take a physical object to be must sit well 
with our theories of knowledge; so long as we add, in both cases, that the 
connection holds the other  way around as well. 
 
B.   Authors Intention 
 
The chief test of the aesthetic hypothesis lies, however, not in its 
resistance to these various charges, but in its explanatory and 
particularly its critical power. If we accept that theories of interpretation 
are independent analyses of what it means to interpret something but 
are rather based in and dependent upon normative theories of art, then 
we must accept that they are vulnerable to complaints against the nor-
mative theory in which they are based. It does seem to me, for example, 
that the more doctrinaire author's intention theories are vulnerable in 
this way. These theories must suppose, on the present hypothesis, that 
what is valuable in a work of art, what should lead us to value one work 
of art more than another, is limited to what the author in some narrow 
and constrained sense intended to put there. This claim presupposes, as 
I suggested earlier, a more general thesis that art must be understood as 
a form of speaker-audience communication; but even that doubtful 
thesis turns out, on further inspection, not to support it.  
Of course the "intentionalists" would object to these remarks. They 
would insist that their theory of interpretation is not an account in a 
book or poem or play but only an account of what is valuable in a book 
or poem or play but only an account of what any particular book or 
poem or play means and that we must understand what something 
means before we can decide whether it is valuable and where its value 
lies. And they would object that they do not say that only intentions of 
the author "in some narrow and constrained sense” count in fixing the 
meaning of his work. 
In the first of these objections, the author's intention theory presents 
itself not as the upshot of the aesthetic hypothesis – not as the  
 
best theory of interpretation within the design stipulated by that hy-
pothesis- but rather as a rival to it, a better theory about what kind of 
thing an interpretation is. But it is very difficult to understand the au-
thor's intention theory as any sort of rival to the present hypothesis. 
What question does it propose to answer better? Not, certainly, some 
question about the ordinary language or even technical meaning of the 
words "meaning" or "interpretation." An intentionalist cannot suppose 
that all his critics and those he criticizes mean, when they say "interpre-
tation," the discovery of the author's intention. Nor can he think that his 
claims accurately describe what every member of the critical fraternity in 
fact does under the title "interpretation." If that were so, then his 
strictures and polemics would be unnecessary. But if his theory is not 
semantic or empirical in these ways, what sort of a theory is it?  
Suppose an intentionalist replies: 
It points out an important issue about works of literature, namely: 
What did the author of the work intend it to be? This is plainly an 
important question, even if its importance is preliminary to other 
equally or more important questions about significance or value. It 
is, in fact, what most people for a long time have called 
"interpretation." But the name does not matter, so long as the 
activity is recognized as important and so long as it is understood 
that scholars are in principle capable of supplying objectively 
correct answers to the question it poses. 
This reply comes to this: we can discover what an author intended 
(or at least some to probabilistic conclusions about this) and it is im-
portant to do so for other literary purposes. But why is it important? 
What other purposes? Any answer will assume that value or significance 
in art attaches primarily to what the author intended, just because it is 
what the author intended. Otherwise, why should we evaluate what this 
style of interpretation declares to be the work of art? But then the claim 
that interpretation in this style is important depends on a highly 
controversial, normative theory of art, not a neutral observation 
preliminary to any coherent evaluation. Of course no plausible theory of 
interpretation holds that the intention of the author is always irrelevant. 
Sometimes it is plainly the heart of the matter, as when some issue turns 
on what Shakespeare meant by "hawk" as distinguished from 
"handsaw." But it is nevertheless controversial that we must know 
whether Shakespeare thought Hamlet was mad or sane pretending to be 
mad in order to decide how good a play he wrote. The intentionalist 
thinks that we do, and that is exactly why his theory of interpretation is 
not a rival to the aesthetic hypothesis but rather a suitor for the crown 
that hypothesis holds out. 536 537 
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The second objection to my charge against author's intention theories 
may prove to be more interesting. Intentionalists make the author's state 
of mind central to interpretation. But they misunderstand, so far as I can 
tell, certain complexities in that state of mind; in particular they fail to 
appreciate how intentions for a work and beliefs about it interact. I have 
in mind an experience familiar to anyone who creates anything, of 
suddenly seeing something "in" it that he did not previously know was 
there. This is sometimes (though I think not very well) expressed in the 
author's cliché, that his characters seem to have minds of their own. John 
Fowles provides an example from popular fiction. 
When Charles left Sarah on her Cliff edge, I ordered him to walk straight 
back to Lyme Regis. But he did not; he gratuitously turned and went 
down to the Dairy. 
Oh, but you say, come on- what I really mean is that the idea crossed 
my mind as I wrote that it might be more clever to have him stop and 
drink milk... and meet Sarah again. That is certainly one explanation of 
what happened; but I can only report-and I am the most reliable witness- 
that the idea seemed to me to come clearly from Charles, not myself. It is 
not only that he has begun to gain an autonomy; I must respect it, and 
disrespect all my quasi-divine plans for him, if I wish him to be real.4 
Fowles changed his mind about how the story in The French Lieu-
tenant's Woman "really" goes in the midst of writing it, if we are to credit 
this description. But he might also have changed his mind about some 
aspect of the novel's "point" years later, as he is rumored to have done 
after seeing the film made from his book. He might have come to see 
Sarah's motives very differently after reading Harold Pinter's screenplay 
or watching Meryl Streep play her; Pinter and Streep were interpreting 
the novel, and one or both of their interpretations might have led Fowles 
to change his interpretation once again. Perhaps I am wrong in supposing 
that this sort of thing happens often. But it happens often enough, and it is 
important to be clear about what it is that happens. 
The intentionalist wants us to choose between two possibilities. 
Either the author suddenly realizes that he had a "subconscious inten-
tion" earlier, which he only now discovers, or he has simply changed his 
intention later. Neither of those explanations is at all satisfactory. The 
subconscious is in danger of becoming phlogiston here, unless we 
suppose some independent evidence, apart from the author's new view 
of his work, to suggest that he had an earlier subconscious intention. I 
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do not mean that features of a work of art of which an author is unaware 
must be random accidents. On the contrary, if a novel is both more 
interesting and more coherent if we assume the characters have motives 
different from those the novelist thought of when he wrote (or if a poet's 
tropes and style tend to reinforce his theme in ways he did not 
appreciate at the time), the cause of this must in some way lie in the 
artist's talent. Of course there are unsolved mysteries in the psychology 
of creation, but the supposition of subconscious intentions, unsupported 
by other evidence of the sort a psychoanalyst would insist on, solves no 
mysteries and provides no explanation. This is not crucial to the point, 
however, because whether or not Fowles had a subconscious intention 
to make Charles or Sarah different characters from the "quasi-divine 
plan" he thought he had, his later decisions and beliefs neither consist in 
nor are based on any discovery of that earlier intention. They are 
produced by confronting not his earlier self but the work he has 
produced. 
Nor is any new belief Fowles forms about his characters properly 
called (as in the intentionalist's second suggestion) a new and discrete 
intention. It is not an intention about what sort of characters to create 
because it is a belief about what sort of characters he has created; and it 
is not an intention about how others should understand the book, 
though it may or may not include an expectation of that sort. Fowles 
changed his view in the course of writing his book, but he changed it, as 
he insists, by confronting the text he had already written, by treating its 
characters as real in the sense of detachable from his own antecedent 
designs, in short by interpreting it, and not by exploring the 
subconscious depths of some previous plan or finding that he had a new 
plan. If it is true that he changed his mind again, after seeing the film, 
then this was, once again, not a retrospective new intention or a 
rediscovered old one. It was another interpretation. 
An author is capable of detaching what he has written from his 
earlier intentions and beliefs, of treating it as an object in itself. He is 
capable of reaching fresh conclusions about his work grounded in 
aesthetic judgments: that his book is both more coherent and a analysis 
of more important themes read in a somewhat different way from what 
he thought when he was writing it. This is, I think, a very important fact 
for a number of reasons; but I want, for my present purpose, only to 
emphasize one. Any full description of what Fowles “intended" when he 
set out to write The French Lieutenant's Woman must include the intention 
to produce something capable of being treated that way, by himself and 
therefore by others, and so must include the 
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intention to create something independent of his intentions. I quote 
Fowles once again, and again as a witness rather than for his meta-
physics: "Only one reason is shared by all of us [novelists]: we wish to 
create worlds as real as, but other than, the world that is. Or was. That is why 
we cannot plan . . . . We also know that a genuinely created world must 
be independent of its creator . . .”5 
I suspect that regarding something one has produced as a novel or 
poem or painting, rather than a set of propositions or marks, depends on 
regarding it as something that can be detached and interpreted in the 
sense I described. In any case, this is characteristically how authors 
themselves regard what they have done. The intentions of authors are 
not simply conjunctive, like the intentions of someone who goes to 
market with a shopping list, but structured, so that the more concrete of 
these intentions, like intentions about the motives of a particular char-
acter in a novel, are contingent on interpretive beliefs whose soundness 
varies with what is produced and which might be radically altered from 
time to time. 
We can, perhaps, isolate the full set of interpretive beliefs an author 
has at a particular moment (say at the moment he sends final galleys to 
the printer) and solemnly declare that these beliefs, in their full 
concreteness, fix what the novel is or means. (Of course, these beliefs 
would inevitably be incomplete, but that is another matter.) But even if 
we (wrongly) call this particular set of beliefs "intentions," we are, in 
choosing them, ignoring another kind or level of intention, which is the 
intention to create a work whose nature or meaning is not fixed in this 
way, because it is a work of art. That is why the authors´ intention 
school, as I understand it, makes the value of a work of art turn on a 
narrow and constrained view of the intentions of the author. 
 
III.   Law and Literature 
 
A.   The Chain of Law 
 
These sketchy remarks about literary interpretation may have sug-
gested too sharp a split between the role of the artist in creating a work 
of art and that of the critic in interpreting it later. The artist can create 
nothing without interpreting as he creates; since he intends to produce 
art, he must have at least a tacit theory of why what he produces is art 
and why it is a better work of art through this stroke of the pen or the 
brush or the chisel rather than that. The critic, for his part, creates as he 
interprets; for though he is bound by the fact of the work, defined in 
                                                           
5 Id. at 96 (emphasis in original) 
the more formal and academic parts of his theory of art, his more prac-
tical artistic sense is engaged by his responsibility to decide which way 
of seeing or reading or understanding that work shows it as better art. 
Nevertheless there is a difference between interpreting while creating 
and creating while interpreting, and therefore a recognizable difference 
between the artist and the critic. 
I want to use literary interpretation as a model for the central 
method of legal analysis, and I therefore need to show how even this 
distinction between artist and critic might be eroded in certain circum-
stances. Suppose that a group of novelists is engaged for a particular 
project and that they draw lots to determine the order of play. The 
lowest number writes the opening chapter of a novel, which he or she 
then sends to the next number who adds a chapter, with the under-
standing that he is adding a chapter to that novel rather than beginning  
a new one, and then sends the two chapters to the next number, and so 
on. Now every novelist but the first has the dual responsibilities of 
interpreting and creating, because each must read all that has gone 
before in order to establish, in the interpretivist sense, what the novel so 
far created is.6 He or she must decide what the characters are “really”  
 
                                                           
6 Even the first novelist has the responsibility of interpreting to the extent any writer must 
which includes not only interpreting as he writes but interpreting the genre in which he sets out to 
write. Will novelists with higher numbers have less creative “freedom” than those with lower? In 
one sense, no novelist has any freedom at all, because each is constrained to choose that 
interpretation which (he believes) makes the continuing work of art the best it can be. But we have 
already seen (and the discussion of law below will elaborate) two different dimensions along which 
any interpretation can be tested: the "formal" dimension, which asks how far the interpretation fits 
and integrates the text so far completed, and the "substantive" dimension, which considers the 
soundness of the view about what makes a novel good on which the interpretation relies. It seems 
reasonable to suppose that later novelists will normally- but certainly not inevitably- believe that 
fewer interpretations can survive the first of these tests than would have survived had they received 
fewer chapters. Most interpreters would think that a certain interpretation of a Christmas Carol- that 
Scrooge was inherently evil, for example- would pass the test of integrity just after the opening 
pages, but not towards the end of the novel. Our sense that later novelists are less "free" may reflect 
just that fact. This does not mean, of course, that there is more likely to be consensus about the 
correct interpretation later rather than earlier in the chain, or that a later  novelist is more likely to 
find an argument that "proves" his interpretation right beyond rational  challenge. Reasonable 
disagreement is available on the formal as well as the substantive side, and even when most 
novelists would think only a particular interpretation could fit the novel to a certain point, some 
novelists of imagination might find some dramatic change in  plot that (in his opinion) unexpectedly 
unifies what had seemed disparate and unnecessary, and redeems what had seemed wrong or trivial 
Once again, we should be careful not to confuse the fact that consensus would rarely be reached, at 
any point in the process, with the claim that any particular novelist´s interpretation must be "merely 
subjective." No novelist, at any point, will be able simply to read in a mechanical way the correct 
interpretation off the text he receives but it does not follow from  that fact alone that one 
interpretation is not superior to others overall. In any case, it will nevertheless be true, for all 
novelists beyond the first, that the assignment to find (what they believe to be) the correct 
interpretation of the text so far is a different assignment from the assignment to begin a novel of 
their own. For a fuller discussion, see Dworkin, “Natural” Law Revisited, 34 A. FLA. L. REV. 165 
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like; what motives in fact guide them; what the point or theme of the 
developing novel is; how far some literary device or figure, consciously 
or unconsciously used, contributes to these, and whether it should be 
extended or refined or trimmed or dropped in order to send the novel 
further in one direction rather than another. This must be interpretation 
in a non-intention-bound style because, at least for all novelists after the 
second, there is no single author whose intentions any interpreter can, 
by the rules of the project, regard as decisive. 
Some novels have in fact been written in this way (including the 
soft-core pornographic novel Naked Came the Stranger7), though for a 
debunking purpose, and certain parlor games for rainy weekends in 
English country houses have something of the same structure. But in my 
imaginary exercise the novelists are expected to take their responsi-
bilities seriously and to recognize the duty to create, so far as they can, a 
single, unified novel rather than, for example, a series of independent 
short stories with characters bearing the same names. Perhaps this is an 
impossible assignment; perhaps the project is doomed to produce not 
simply a bad novel but no novel at all, because the best theory of art 
requires a single creator or, if more than one, that each have some 
control over the whole. (But what about legends and jokes?) I need not 
push that question further because I am interested only in the fact that 
the assignment makes sense, that each of the novelists in the chain can 
have some idea of what he or she is asked to do, whatever misgivings 
each might have about the value or character of what will then be 
produced. 
Deciding hard cases at law is rather like this strange literary exer-
cise. The similarity is most evident when judges consider and decide 
"common-law" cases; that is, when no statute figures centrally in the 
legal issue, and the argument turns on which rules or principles of law 
"underlie" the related decisions of other judges in the past. Each judge is 
then like a novelist in the chain. He or she must read through what other 
judges in the past have written not simply to discover what these judges 
have said, or their state of mind when they said it, but to reach an 
opinion about what these judges have collectively done, in the way that 
each of our novelists formed an opinion about the collective novel so far 
written. Any judge forced to decide a law suit will find, if he looks in the 
appropriate books, records of many arguably similar cases decided over 
decades or even centuries past by many other judges of different styles 
and judicial and political philosophies, in periods of dif- 
 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
ferent orthodoxies of procedure and judicial convention. Each judge 
must regard himself, in deciding the new case before him, as a partner in 
a complex chain enterprise of which these innumerable decisions, 
structures, conventions, and practices are the history; it is his job to 
continue that history into the future through what he does on the day. 
He must interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility 
to advance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new 
direction of his own. So he must determine, according to his own 
judgment, what the earlier decisions come to, what the point or the 
practice so far, taken as a whole, really is. 
The judge in the hypothetical case I mentioned earlier, about an 
aunt's emotional shock, must decide what the theme is, not only of the 
particular precedent of the mother in the road, but of accident cases, 
including that precedent, as a whole. He might be forced to choose, for 
example, between these two theories about the "meaning" of that chain 
of decisions. According to the first, negligent drivers are responsible to 
those whom their behavior is likely to cause physical harm, are 
responsible to these people for whatever injury- physical or emotional- 
they in fact cause. If this is the correct principle, then the decisive 
difference between that case and the aunt's case is just that the aunt was 
not within the physical risk, and therefore she cannot recover. On the 
second theory, however, negligent drivers are responsible for any 
damage they can reasonably be expected to foresee if they think about 
their behavior in advance. If that is the right principle, then the aunt may 
yet recover. Everything turns on whether it is sufficiently foreseeable 
that a child will have relatives, beyond his or her immediate parents, 
who may suffer emotional shock when they learn of the child's injury. 
The judge trying the aunt's case must decide which of these two 
principles represents the better "reading" of the chain of decisions he 
must continue. 
Can we say, in some general way, what those who disagree the best 
interpretation of legal precedent are disagreeing about. I said that a 
literary interpretation aims to show how the work in question can be 
seen as the most valuable work of art, and so must attend to formal 
features of identity, coherence, and integrity as well as more substantive 
considerations of artistic value. A plausible interpretation of legal 
practice must also, in a parallel way, satisfy a test with two dimensions: 
it must both fit that practice and show its point or value, But point or 
value here cannot mean artistic value because law, unlike literature, is 
not an artistic enterprise. Law is a political enterprise, whose general 
point, if it has one, lies in coordinating social and indi- 
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vidual effort, or resolving social and individual disputes, or securing 
justice between citizens and between them and their government, or 
some combination of these. (This characterization is itself an interpre-
tation, of course, but allowable now because relatively neutral.) So an 
interpretation of any body or division of law, like the law of accidents, 
must show the value of that body of law in political terms by demon-
strating the best principle or policy it can be taken to serve. 
We know from the parallel argument in literature that this general 
description of interpretation in law is not not license for each judge to 
find in doctrinal history whatever he thinks should have been there. The 
same distinction holds between interpretation and ideal. A judge's duty 
is to interpret the legal history he finds, not to invent a better history. 
The dimension of fit will provide some boundaries. There is, of course, 
no algorithm for deciding whether a particular interpretation sufficiently 
fits that history not to be ruled out. When a statute or constitution or 
other legal document is part of the doctrinal history, the speaker's 
meaning will play a role. But the choice of which of several crucially 
different senses of speaker's or legislator's intention is the appropriate 
one cannot itself be referred to anyone's intention but must be decided, 
by whoever must make the decision, as a question of political theory.8 In 
the common-law cases the question of fit is more complex. Any 
particular hypothesis about the point of a string of decisions ("These 
decisions establish the principle that no one can recover for emotional 
damage who did not lie within the area of physical danger himself.") is 
likely to encounter, if not flat counter-examples in some earlier case, at 
least language or argument that seems to suggest the contrary. So any 
useful conception of interpretation must contain a doctrine of mistake - 
as must any novelist's theory of interpretation for the chain novel. 
Sometimes a legal argument will explicitly recognize such mistakes: 
"Insofar as the cases of A v. B and C v. D may have held to the contrary, 
they were, we believe, wrongly decided and need not be followed here." 
Sometimes the doctrine of precedent forbids this crude approach and 
requires something like: "We held, in E v. F, that such-and-such, but that 
case raised special issues and must, we think, be confined to its own 
facts" (which is not quite so disingenuous as it might seem). 
This flexibility may seem to erode the difference on which I insist, 
between interpretation and a fresh, clean-slate decision about what the 
law ought to be. But there is nevertheless this overriding constraint. 
 
                                                           
8 See Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 469 (1981). 
Any judge's sense of the point or function of law, on which every aspect 
of his approach to interpretation will depend, will include or imply 
some conception of the integrity and coherence of law as an institution 
and this conception will both tutor and constrain his working theory of 
fit - that is, his convictions about how much of the prior law an 
interpretation must fit, and which of it, and how. (The parallel with 
literary interpretation holds here as well.) 
It should be apparent, however, that any particular judge's theory of 
fit will often fail to produce a unique interpretation. (The distinction 
between hard and easy cases at law is perhaps just the distinction 
between cases in which they do and do not.) Just as two readings of a 
poem may each find sufficient support in the text to show its unity and 
coherence, so two principles may each find enough support in the 
various decisions of the past to satisfy any plausible theory of fit. In that 
case substantive political theory (like substantive consideration of 
artistic merit) will play a decisive role. Put bluntly, the interpretation of 
accident law, that a careless driver is liable to those whose damage is 
both substantial and foreseeable, is probably a better interpretation, if it 
is, only because it states a sounder principle of justice than any principle 
that distinguishes between physical and emotional damage or that 
makes recovery for emotional damage depend on whether the plaintiff 
was in danger of physical damage. (I should add that this issue as an 
issue of political morality, is in fact very complex, and many 
distinguished judges and lawyers have taken each side.) 
We might summarize these points this way. Judges develop a 
particular approach to legal interpretation by forming and refining a 
political theory sensitive to these issues on which interpretation in 
particular cases will depend; they call this their legal philosophy. It will 
include both structural features, elaborating the general requirement 
interpretation must fit doctrinal history, and substantive claim social 
goals and principles of justice. Any judge's opinion about the best 
interpretation will therefore be the consequence of beliefs other judges 
need not share. If a judge believes that the dominant purpose of a legal 
system, the main goal it ought to serve, is economic, then he will see in 
past accident decisions some strategy for reducing the economic costs of 
accidents overall. Other judges, who find any such picture of the law's 
function distasteful, will discover no such strategy in history but only, 
perhaps, an attempt to reinforce conventional morality of fault and 
responsibility. If we insist on a high order of neutrality in our 
description of legal interpretation, therefore, we cannot make our 
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description of the nature of legal interpretation much more concrete 
than I have. 
 
B.   Author's Intention in Law 
 
I want instead to consider various objections that might be made 
not to the detail of my argument but to the main thesis, that interpreta-
tion in law is essentially political. I shall not spend further time on the 
general objection already noted: that this view of law makes it ir-
reducibly and irredeemably subjective, just a matter of what particular 
judges think best or what they had for breakfast. Of course, for some 
lawyers and legal scholars this is not an objection at all, but only the 
beginnings of skeptical wisdom about law. But it is the nerve of my 
argument that the flat distinction between description and evaluation on 
which this skepticism relies - the distinction between finding the law just 
"there" in history and making it up wholesale - is misplaced here 
because interpretation is something different from both. 
I shall want, therefore, to repeat the various observations I made 
about subjectivity and objectivity in literary interpretation. There is no 
obvious reason in the account I gave of legal interpretation to doubt that 
one interpretation of law can be better than another and that one can be 
best of all. Whether this is so depends on general issues of philosophy 
not peculiar to law any more than to literature; and we would do well, 
in considering these general issues, not to begin with any fixed ideas 
about the necessary and sufficient conditions of objectivity (for example, 
that no theory of law can be sound unless it is demonstrably sound, 
unless it would wring assent from a stone). In the meantime we can 
sensibly aim to develop various levels of a conception of law for 
ourselves, to find the interpretation of a complex and dramatically im-
portant practice which seems to us at once the right kind of interpreta-
tion for law and right as that kind of interpretation. 
I shall consider one further, and rather different, objection in more 
detail: that my political hypothesis about legal interpretation, like the 
aesthetic hypothesis about artistic interpretation, fails to give an 
adequate place to author's intention. It fails to see that interpretation in 
law is simply a matter of discovering what various actors in the legal 
process-constitutional delegates, members of Congress and state legis-
latures, judges, and executive officials - intended. Once again it is im-
portant to see what is at stake here. The political hypothesis makes room 
for the author's intention argument as a conception of interpreta- 
tion, conception which claims that the best political theory gives the 
intentions of legislators and past judges a decisive role in interpretation. 
Seen this way, the author's intention theory does not challenge the 
political hypothesis but contests for its authority. If the present objection 
is really an objection to the argument so far, therefore, its claim must be 
understood differently, as proposing, for example, that the very 
"meaning" of interpretation in law requires that only these officials' 
intentions should count or that at least there is a firm consensus among 
lawyers to that effect. Both of these claims are as silly as the parallel 
claims about the idea or the practice of interpretation in art. 
Suppose, therefore, that we do take the author's intention theory, 
more sensibly, as a conception rather than an explication of the concept 
of legal interpretation. The theory seems on firmest ground, as I 
suggested earlier, when interpretation is interpretation of a canonical 
legal text, like a clause of the Constitution, or a section of a statute, or a 
provision of a contract or will. But just as we noticed that a novelist's 
intention is complex and structured in ways that embarrass any simple 
author's intention theory in literature, we must now notice that a legis-
lator's intention is complex in similar ways. Suppose a delegate to a 
constitutional conception votes for a clause guaranteeing equality of 
treatment without regard to race in matters touching peoples' funda-
mental interests; but he thinks that education is not a matter of funda-
mental interest and so does not believe that the clause makes racially 
segregated schools unconstitutional. We may sensibly distinguish an 
abstract and a concrete intention here: the delegate intends to prohibit 
discrimination in whatever in fact is of fundamental interest and also 
intends not to prohibit segregated schools. These are not isolated, dis-
crete intentions; our descriptions, we might say, describe the same in-
tention in different ways. But it matters very much which description a 
theory of legislative intention accepts as canonical. If we accept the first 
description, then a judge who wishes to follow the delegate's intentions, 
but who believes that education is a matter of fundamental interest, will 
hold segregation unconstitutional. If we accept the second, he will not. 
The choice between the two descriptions cannot be made by any further 
reflection about what an intention really is. It must be made by deciding 
that one rather than the other description is more appropriate in virtue 
of the best theory of representative democracy or on some other openly 
political ground. (I might add that no compelling argument has yet been 
produced, so far as I am aware, in favor of deferring to a delegate's more 
concrete intentions, and that this is of major importance in arguments 
about whether the "original intention" of the Framers requires, for 
example, abolishing racial discrimination, or capital punishment.) 
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When we consider the common-law problems of interpretation, the 
author's intention theory shows in an even poorer light. The problems 
are not simply evidentiary. Perhaps we can discover what was "in the 
mind" of all the judges who decided cases about accidents at one time or 
another in our legal history. We might also discover (or speculate) about 
the psychodynamic or economic or social explanations of why each 
judge thought what he or she did. No doubt the result of all this research 
(or speculation) would be a mass of psychological data essentially 
different for each of the past judges included in the study, and order 
could be brought into the mass, if at all, only through statistical 
summaries about which proportion of judges in which historical period 
probably held which opinion and was more or less subject to which 
influence. But this mass, even tamed by statistical summary, would be of 
no more help to the judge trying to answer the question of what the 
prior decisions, taken as a whole, really come to than the parallel 
information would be to one of our chain novelists trying to decide what 
novel the novelists earlier in the chain had collectively written. That 
judgment, in each case, requires a fresh exercise of interpretation which 
is neither brute historical research nor a clean-slate expression of how 
things ideally ought to be. 
A judge who believed in the importance of discerning an author's 
intention might try to escape these problems by selecting one particular 
judge or a small group of judges in the past (say, the judges who 
decided the most recent case something like his or the case he thinks 
closest to his) and asking what rule that judge on group intended to lay 
down for the future. This would treat the particular earlier judges as 
legislators and so invite all the problems of statutory interpretation in-
cluding the very serious problem we just noticed. Even so, it would not 
even escape the special problems of common-law adjudication after all, 
because the judge who applied this theory of interpretation would have 
to suppose himself entitled to look only to the intentions of the particu-
lar earlier judge or judges he had selected, and he could not suppose this 
unless he thought that it was the upshot of judicial practice as a whole 
(and not just the intentions of some other selected earlier judge) that this 
is what judges in his position should do. 
 
IV. Politics in Interpretation 
 
If my claims about the role of politics in legal interpretation are 
sound, then we should expect to find distinctly liberal or radical or con-
servative opinions not only about what the Constitution and laws of our 
nation should be but also about what they are. And this is exactly 
 
what we do find. Interpretation of the equal protection clause of the 
Constitution provides especially vivid examples. There can be no useful 
interpretation of what that clause means independent of some theory 
about what political equality is and how far equality is required by 
justice, and the history of the last half-century of constitutional law is 
largely an exploration of exactly these issues of political morality, 
Conservative lawyers argued steadily (though not consistently) in favor 
of an author's intentions style of interpreting this clause, and they ac-
cused others, who used a different style with more egalitarian results, of 
inventing rather than interpreting law. But this was bluster meant to 
hide the role their own political convictions played in their choice of 
interpretive style, and the great legal debates over the equal protection 
clause would have been more illuminating if it had been more widely 
recognized that reliance on political theory is not a corruption of 
interpretation but part of what interpretation means. 
Should politics play any comparable role in literary and other 
artistic interpretation? We have become used to the idea of the politics of 
interpretation. Stanley Fish, particularly, has promoted a theory of 
interpretation which supposes that contests between rival schools of 
literary interpretation are more political than argumentative: rival 
professoriates in search of dominion. And of course it is a truism of the 
sociology of literature, and not merely of the Marxist contribution to that 
discipline, that fashion in interpretation is sensitive to and ex. presses 
more general political and economic structures. These important claims 
are external: they touch the causes of the rise of this or that approach to 
literature and interpretation. 
We are now concerned with the internal question, about politics in 
rather than the politics of interpretation.9 How far can principles of 
political morality actually count as arguments for a particular interpre-
tation of a particular work or for a general approach to artistic interpre-
tation? There are many possibilities and many of them are parasitic on 
claims developed or in these essays. It was said that our commitment to 
feminism, or our fidelity to nation, or our dissatisfaction with the rise of 
the New Right, ought to influence our evaluation and appreciation of 
literature. Indeed it was the general (though not unanimous) sense of the 
conference that professional criticism must be faulted for its inattention 
to such political issues. But if our convictions about these particular 
political issues count in deciding how good some novel or play or poem 
is, then they must also count in deciding, among particular 
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interpretations of these works, which is the best interpretation. Or so 
they must if my argument is sound. 
We might also explore a more indirect connection between aesthetic 
and political theory. Any comprehensive theory of art is likely to have, 
at its center, some epistemological thesis, some set of views about the 
relations that hold among experience, self-consciousness, and the 
perception or formation of values. If it assigns self-discovery any role in 
art, it will need a theory of personal identity adequate to mark off the 
boundaries of a person from his or her circumstances, and from other 
persons, or at least to deny the reality of any such boundaries. It seems 
likely that any comprehensive theory of social justice will also have roots 
in convictions about these or very closely related issues. Liberalism, for 
example, which assigns great importance to autonomy, may depend 
upon a particular picture of the role that judgments of value play in 
people's lives; it may depend on the thesis that people's convictions 
about value are beliefs, open to argument and review, rather than 
simply the givens of personality, fixed by genetic and social causes. And 
any political theory that gives an important place to equality also 
requires assumptions about the boundaries of persons, because it must 
distinguish between treating people as equals and changing them into 
different people. 
It may be a sensible project, at least, to inquire whether there are not 
particular philosophical bases shared by particular aesthetic and 
particular political theories so that we can properly speak of a liberal or 
Marxist or perfectionist or totalitarian aesthetics, for example, in that 
sense. Common questions and problems hardly guarantee this, of 
course. It would be necessary to see, for example, whether liberalism can 
indeed be traced, as many philosophers have supposed, back into a 
discrete epistemological base, different from that of other political the-
ories, and then ask whether that discrete base could be carried forward 
into aesthetic theory and there yield a distinctive interpretive style. I 
have no good idea that this project could be successful, and I end simply 
by acknowledging my sense that politics, art, and law are united, 
somehow, in philosophy. 
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